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Abstract: The contribution deals with the emerging 
strategies to fight corruption through prevention 
at the international level, in the respect of national 
sovereignity. It describes the request for a holistic 
strategy, combining prevention and prosecution, 
mobilizing all the components of the domestic 
community and establishing dedicated and 
independent competent bodies.
It questions whether it is possible to strengthen 
the system of corruption prevention by linking 
independent institutions to the National Constitution, 
European Union law, and customary law.
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Resumo: O artigo lida com as estratégias da luta contra 
a corrupção por meio da prevenção em nível interna-
cional, em respeito à soberania nacional. Ele descreve 
a solicitação de uma estratégia holística, combinando 
prevenção e acusação, mobilizando todos os compo-
nentes da comunidade doméstica e estabelecendo 
corpos competentes comprometidos e independentes.
Este trabalho questiona a possibilidade de enrigecer 
o sistema de prevenção à corrupção por meio da pro-
moção de relação entre instituições independentes, 
Constituição Nacional, Direito da União Europeia e 
Direito consuetudinário.
Palavra-chave: Prevenção à corrupção; Perspectiva 
internacional; Institucionalização.
1. The establishment of a detailed international 
anti-corruption strategy 
Observing the layers of the many international anti-
corruption norms based on hard and soft law, it seems possible 
to outline an emerging model for preventing corruption, 
which from a structural, institutional, organisational and 
functional perspective is presented to domestic legal 
systems both at the international level and at the regional 
and continental level as not only useful, but also in some 
cases an essential source of inspiration for national policies 
in this area. In fact, more and more, the international legal 
context is presented as a “place” no longer and not so much 
for comparing sovereign national systems, but for preparing 
guidelines to enable individual national policies to converge 
towards models that can at least reciprocally interact even 
if they are not shared.  
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This is undoubtedly a consequence, in the legal context, 
of the factual process of globalisation. However, it is also the 
result of the evolution of the international community from 
the model that emerged from the peace of Westphalia to the 
“UN model”: in this second model, the sovereign equality of 
all States is no less important; it remains, but is linked with 
the principle of international law. Indeed, the latter balances 
out the former with a drastic reduction of the perimeter of 
each country’s own dominion, particularly in relation to the 
treatment of persons who fall within its national jurisdiction. 
The pursuit of peace, the maintenance and strengthening 
of the rule of law, democracy, respect for the principle of 
liberty and fundamental human rights become matters of 
international concern. Consequently, within the international 
community, the State is responsible for protecting the 
untouchable nature of its sovereignty, but it must achieve 
this by combining it with the aim of governing its territorial 
community in accordance with the principles cited above2. 
Of course, this does not mean rejecting a founding principle 
of the modern international community, but adding new 
dimensions to it. 
Due to this process of dialogue between States, 
the sharing of political and legal pathways including by 
comparing models, their circulation and reciprocal influence, 
they therefore became the common model for comparison 
between the States themselves.  
2 On this model see T.H. Widlak, From International Society to International 
Community: The Constitutional Evolution of International Law, Gdansk Un. 
Press, 2015, passim; E. Cannizzaro, Diritto internazionale, Turin, 20142, pp. 5-6; 
N. Parisi, Le Nazioni Unite. La tutela dei diritti della persona, in U. Draetta, M. 
Fumagalli (eds.), Organizzazione internazionale – Parte speciale, Milan, 20112, 
p. 43.
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Now, it is without doubt that corruption offences are 
increasingly characterised by their transnational nature3 even 
if that feature is due only (though it is hardly trivial) to “the 
nature or impact of such offences or from a special need to 
combat them on a common basis”4: this latter eventuality 
is truly symptomatic in the case of fighting corruption. 
Anti-corruption activity, therefore, involves a framework of 
close consultation between different State authorities, at the 
many levels involved, in the context of intergovernmental 
cooperation in order to contain its diffusion and combat 
the damage it causes5. The same international conventions 
on the subject, which the States stipulated, are the ones 
that6 show how corruption is perceived by those States 
3 For further reading on corruption involving public authorities, see M. 
Arnone, L.S. Borlini, Corruption. Economic Analysis and International Law, 
Cheltenham-Northampton, 2014, p. 176 et seq.; in relation to corruption 
between private individuals E. La Rosa, Corruzione privata e diritto penale. 
A proposito della concorrenza come bene comune, Turin, 2018, p. 20 et seq.
4 Art. 83, no. 2, TFEU is used for the particular significance of the expression. 
On the need to fight corruption at the global level, see among many others, 
S. Williams-Elegbe, Fighting Corruption in Public Procurement. A Comparative 
Analysis of Disqualification or Debarment Measures, Oxford-Portland, 2012, 
passim.
5 The damages caused by corruption are well summarised, for example, in 
the first paragraph of the Preamble of the Merida Convention); see among 
others, V. Mongillo, La corruzione tra sfera interna e dimensione internazionale, 
Naples, 2012, p. 8 et seq.; G.M. Racca, R. Cavallo Perin, Corruption as a violation 
of fundamental rights: reputation risk as a deterrent against the lack of loyalty, in 
G. M. Racca, C.R. Yukins (eds.), Integrity and Efficiency in Sustainable Public 
Contracts, Brussels, 2014, p. 23 et seq.; with a perspective that also considers 
other factors related to poor administrative functioning, for example:, see 
S. Valaguzza, Governare per contratto. Come creare valore attraverso i contratti 
pubblici, Milan, 2018.
6 This is covered mainly by: The United Nations Convention against 
Corruption (UNCAC, opened for signature in Merida on 9 December 2003); 
and the Convention (opened for signature in Paris on 17 December 1997 
in the context of the OECD) on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials 
in International Business Transactions. With regard to the European regional 
context, see: the two Conventions prepared within the context of the 
Council of Europe (opened for signature in Strasbourg respectively on 27 
January 1999 and 04 November 1999, called the Criminal Law Convention on 
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as a practice capable of jeopardising some of the basic 
principles of the stability of the inter-State system (of the 
international community as a whole) and of the individual 
national communities, compromising their values and 
basic legal interests: if the State apparatus is complicit 
(passively or actively) in these practices (this also being a 
violation of human rights, starting with the principle of 
non-discrimination), the result will be fragile democratic 
institutions caused by citizens losing faith in the ability of 
the latter to govern the territorial community impartially and 
efficiently. The reference international conventions make to 
the risk to which the rule of law is exposed is highly relevant7. 
Corruption and the Civil Law Convention on Corruption); the Convention on 
the Protection of the European Communities’ Financial Interests adopted 
by the Council of the European Union on 26 July 1995, completed by three 
protocols (the first, dated 27 September 1996, on  corruption of Community 
officials; the second (dated 19 June 1997) on the responsibility of legal 
entities and associated sanctions, money laundering and confiscation, 
cooperation between the services of the European Commission and Member 
States, as well as data protection; the third (of 29 November 1996) on the 
jurisdiction of the EU Court of Justice to interpret the Convention through 
preliminary rulings; the Convention on the fight against corruption involving 
officials of the European Communities or officials of Member States of the European 
Union, adopted by the Council of the European Union on 25 May 1997; 
Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of the Council of the European Union, 
of 22 July 2003, on combating corruption in the private sector (the legislative kit 
established by the Community is much more detailed since it is divided 
into numerous hard and soft law measures to which reference will duly be 
made in what follows below: see in particular paragraph 3 (at footnotes 
46-51); 4 (at footnotes 72-73); 6 (at footnotes 94-96); 7 (at footnotes 102-111); 8 
(at footnotes 123-131); 9 (at footnotes 141-149). Also the Palermo Convention 
(opened for signature on 15 December 2000) against Transnational Organized 
Crime contains a measure that extends its objective scope of application 
to corruption offences (Art. 3) and indeed the Merida Convention was 
adopted as a necessary completion of the same. For a discussion on all 
these instruments and their different fields of application, see N. Parisi, 
D. Rinoldi, L’applicazione in Italia di strumenti giuridici internazionali contro la 
corruzione, in G. Forti (eds.), Il prezzo della tangente. La corruzione come sistema 
a dieci anni da ‘mani pulite’, Milan (Vita e Pensiero), 2003, p. 221 et seq. About 
other regional contexts see: African Convention on preventing and combating 
corruption, 11 July 2003; Arab anti-corruption Convention,  21 December 2010; 
Inter-American Convention against corruption, 29 March 1996.
7 In particular see 1st paragraph Preamble UNCAC; 4th paragraph Preamble 
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Again, these conventions have been stipulated in 
order to fight actions capable of distorting competition and 
impeding economic development8. In this context, current 
international law asks States to guarantee commercial 
freedom9; this freedom is accompanied by the responsibility 
of each State to ensure that said freedom is enjoyed in the 
context of competition, “on a footing of absolute or relative 
equality”10, in particular by fighting the pathological 
distribution of wealth, which always results wherever 
corruption is present11. 
2. The need for a holistic strategy: prevention 
and prosecution as reciprocally integrated 
approaches for effective action against cor-
ruption
In the context of the framework outlined above, in the 
first part of this century, States acknowledged the inadequacy 
and insufficiency of a strategy based only on substantive 
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. 
8 See the references cited in note 6 above.
9 P. Picone, Diritto internazionale dell’economia e costituzione economica 
dell’ordinamento internazionale, in P. Picone, G. Sacerdoti (eds.), Diritto 
internazionale dell’economia, Milan (Franco Angeli), 1982.
10 G. Schwarezenberger, The Principles and Standards of International Economic 
Law, in Rec. des Cours, 1966-1, p. 48.
11 Art. 3, paragraph 2, of the Italian Constitution is a domestic translation of 
this internationally applicable obligation, where it States that “It is the duty 
of the Republic to remove all economic and social obstacles that, by limiting 
the freedom and equality of citizens, prevent full individual development 
and the participation of all workers in the political, economic and social 
organisation of the country”. On the subject of safeguarding competition 
between private entities against corruption, see the recent contribution by 
E. La Rosa, Corruzione privata e diritto penale. cit., pp. 13-14 and passim.
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and procedural criminal law intended to harmonise the 
prosecuting instruments and coordinate the different phases 
essential to carrying out criminal prosecutions: in fact, this 
was the strategy (of the repressive sort) implemented almost 
exclusively in the treaties (which were very important) 
signed during the last century on fighting corruption, both 
domestic and international. These treaties (still in force and 
very useful) are traditionally based on two pillars: they are 
mainly intended to place the contracting parties under an 
obligation to criminalise corruption, identifying criminally 
significant circumstances to be covered by domestic legal 
systems; consequently, and in an ancillary capacity, they 
establish methods of cooperation between the respective 
national authorities tasked with applying criminal law. 
There were two factors behind the abandonment of 
this strategy. 
Firstly, in countries with a constitutional structure, 
repressive measures represent the extrema ratio, the response 
of last resort that the legal system gives to an event that 
requires, due to its severe deviation from norms that protect 
interests that are considered fundamental, a response that 
other instruments are unable to offer12. Therefore, before 
resorting to this, other methods must be tried: in this context 
criminal law demonstrates its subsidiarity. 
Furthermore, the purely repressive approach was 
clearly shown to be inadequate for preventing corruption 
from becoming embedded, that is, from becoming 
widespread and pervasive: when this situation arises, 
criminal law is not the appropriate instrument, since the 
12 N. Jareborg, Criminalization as Last Resort (Ultima Ratio), in 2 Ohio St. J. Crim. 
L., p. 531. In recent Italian criminal law literature, see C.E. Palieri, Pragmatica 
e paradigmatica della clausola di “extrema ratio”, in Riv. it. dir. proc. pen., 2018, 
p. 1447 et seq.
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role of criminal law is to establish individual liability (of the 
natural person or collective entity) in relation to an offence 
against a legal interest whose protection requires extreme 
measures of defence; and not to implement measures that 
are intended to combat a deviant social phenomenon. In 
this latter case, action to fight against corruption can only 
be exercised ex ante in the first instance, through prevention, 
therefore including through instruments made available 
by administrative law, without excluding the subsequent 
support of important repressive measures when exercised 
effectively. In this context it has justifiably been noted 
that “the synergy between administrative and criminal” 
is “unavoidable”, emphasising the need to make use of 
preventive measures, through the “strengthening (…) of 
administrative instruments” that “avoid radicalisation 
towards (…) extreme uses of criminal law”13. In fighting 
corruption, therefore, prosecution and prevention turn out 
to be inseparable and complementary options and measures. 
To combat the pervasive penetration of corruption, 
the various areas of inter-governmental cooperation 
have therefore also developed a different type of defence 
from the prosecution traditionally employed, organically 
implementing suggestions, instruments, procedures and 
institutions variously proposed in the past, even in a 
disorganised manner, in the many international institutional 
contexts. Two approaches were used to deal with this 
issue: on the one hand, it was proposed that awareness 
should be raised in relation to the severity of the damage 
caused by corrupt practices, primarily in order to heighten 
collective understanding and social concern in relation to 
certain practices, eliciting that (reputation based) sanction 
13 F. Palazzo, Corruzione pubblica. Repressione penale e prevenzione 
amministrativa, Florence (Florence University Press), 2011, p. 96.
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that other serious deviant behaviours provoke, or rather, 
the social isolation of the perpetrator; on the other hand, 
educating those involved in public and private work to 
adopt a different “lifestyle”. There is no doubt, in fact, that 
the pervasiveness and diffusion of corruption demonstrate 
the existence of a cultural aspect: corruption originates and 
becomes embedded in a particular cultural context, with its 
own laws and structural mechanisms14; it does not come from 
outside the legal system concerned and it must be fought 
primarily in its own territory.
It was thanks to the Convention opened for signature 
in Merida in 2003 (which by being agreed at a global level, in 
the context of the United Nations marked the awareness of 
the community of States in relation to fighting corruption15) 
that there was a significant change in strategy: in fact, the 
Convention offers a wide, well-organised set of legislative 
provisions that include preventive measures16.
Furthermore, even “first generation” international 
agreements (those, to be clear, with criminal law content) 
were already focused on a method of application aimed 
at protecting the integrity of legal systems and civil and 
business circles through instruments to prevent corruption. 
This is an approach that can be seen clearly, for example, 
in the activities performed by the Working Group on 
Bribery (WGB) created following the entry into force of the 
OECD Convention of 199717: even though it has primary 
responsibility for verifying the State of compliance with the 
14 I. Sales, Dove nasce la corruzione, in Il Mattino, 12 October 2017, pp. 1 and 47. 
15 The UN Convention against Corruption (cited in note 5) was ratified (on 26 
June 2018) by one hundred and eighty-six parties and an international 
organisation for regional integration, the European Union (see https://
www.unodc.org//en/ corruption/ratification-status.html).
16 Set out under Arts. 5-14.
17 Ibid supra, note 5.
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Convention of 1997, it also works to prevent corruption, as 
we see from many clarifications given on the governance of 
public authorities, the private sector and entrepreneurial 
activity in light of principles of integrity, transparency, 
competence and accountability18. Furthermore, it should 
be noted that the Convention, despite being based on 
criminal law, was able to guide the Italian legal system 
(and those of other Member States) towards prevention 
strategies developed around adopting risk-based techniques 
and organised around compliance models, which will be 
discussed briefly in what follows19. This means, by referring 
to hard law obligations related specifically to criminal law, 
that this organisation also managed to protect, through soft 
law instruments, the prevention aspect by establishing a 
culture of integrity.
The same approach is used in so-called peer review 
procedures, which consist of an evaluation of each Member 
State’s fulfilment of its obligations under the Convention. 
This type of obligation has been integrated into common 
practice by the demand to comply with soft laws, so much 
so that, for example, with regard to the Council of Europe, 
GRECO (and similarly the OECD’s previously mentioned 
WGB20) evaluates national compliance in light of soft laws 
18 In this context, see the very interesting ideas presented by S. Bonfigli, La 
dimensione sovranazionale dell’etica pubblica, in F. Merloni R. Cavallo Perin 
(editors), Al servizio della Nazione, Milan (Franco Angeli), 2009, p. 400 et seq. 
For a useful comparison between the UNCAC and the OECD Convention, 
see L. Borlini, P. Magrini, La lotta alla corruzione internazionale dall’ambito 
OCSE alla dimensione ONU, in Dir. comm. internaz., 2007, p. 15 et seq.
19 The necessary reference is in Legislative Decree no. 231/2001 adopted 
further to Law no. 300/2000 authorising the ratification of the OECD 
Convention (as well as three other international agreements concerning 
anti-corruption).
20 M. Montanari, La normativa italiana in materia di corruzione al vaglio delle 
istituzioni internazionali. I rapporti dell’Unione europea, del Working Group on 
Bribery dell’OCSE e del GRECO concernenti il nostro Paese, in Dir. pen. cont., 1 
July 2012.
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also, which focus attention on prevention and no longer just 
prosecution21.
We must also consider that in international praxis, a 
strictly criminal categorisation of the concept of corruption 
(on which the relevant conventions tend to give a similar, 
almost overlapping definition22) was joined by a sociological 
notion23: this envelopes those behaviours that are considered 
to be “bad administration”, which are not considered in 
terms of suppressive measures, sometimes being entirely 
without the significance of illegality, being based on mere 
irregularities, but which still translate into turning public 
interest into a private interest24 and which, therefore, stand 
21 In fact, the peer review is implemented starting with the two European 
Conventions of 1999 as supplemented by: Resolution (97) 24 on the twenty 
guiding principles for the fight against Corruption; Recommendation No. R 
(2000) 10 of the Committee of Ministers to Members States on codes of conduct 
for public officials (including a model code); Additional Protocol to the Criminal 
Law Convention on Corruption (ETS No. 191); Recommendation Rec (2003)4 of 
the Committee of Ministers to members States on common rules against corruption 
in the funding of political parties and electoral campaigns. With regard to the 
Council of Europe, the assessment of the Member States is performed by 
the “Group of States against Corruption” (GRECO): it is thanks to the expanded 
legal base that the 4th round of evaluations has been able to examine the 
compliance of those countries that are part of GRECO with regard to 
preventing corruption amongst members of parliament, judges and public 
prosecutors. For a general discussion, see L. Salazar, Contrasto alla corruzione 
e processi internazionali di mutua valutazione: l’Italia davanti ai suoi giudici, in 
Cass. pen., 2012, p. 4270 et seq.
22 There are important differences with regard to subjective application (see 
supra, end of note 5), but with regard to the material object of the offence, 
there is broad agreement, generally based on improper advantage expressed 
very vaguely as “any undue advantage” (Arts. 2-3 Criminal Law Convention on 
Corruption; Art. 2 Civil Law Convention on Corruption; Art. 15 UNCAC). The 
OECD Convention stands out because it identifies the crime of transnational 
corruption (or international) in relation to economic transactions, which is 
a crime that must be included within the legal system of each contracting 
party (on this see S. Manacorda, La corruzione internazionale del pubblico 
agente, Naples, 1999).
23 M. Arnone, S. Borlini, Corruption, ibid, pp. 314-321.
24 A. Vannucci, L’evoluzione della corruzione in Italia: evidenza empirica, fattori 
facilitanti, politiche di contrasto, www.astrid-online.it/static/upload/
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out for their illegality or even just their irregularity: in 
international law, the expression wrongdoing is used, which 
is a very non-technical and broad term25. In this context, it 
is appropriate to examine the concept of corruption and 
the recent tendency to include within it not only criminally 
relevant actions, but also those attributable to so-called 
“administrative corruption”26: this refers to “actions and 
behaviours that, even if they do not amount to specific 
crimes, are contrary to the required care for public interest 
and prejudice the trust of citizens in the impartiality of public 
authorities and the individuals who perform roles of public 
interest”27. Therefore, any “situation in which, regardless 
of the criminal relevance, there is a malfunction of a public 
authority due to the distorted use of the powers granted” 
will be detected28. 
In reality it does not seem necessary to coin a definition 
of administrative corruption29 in order to connect it with 
protected/Vann/Vannucci.pdf.
25 The Italian system of prevention is also informed by this approach: 
Department of Public Administration memo no. 1/2013 (specifically p. 
4. Similarly, the National Anti-corruption Plan, 2015, paragraph 2.1), in 
commenting on certain questions of interpretation raised by the “Severino 
Law” (Law no. 190/2012), it underlines the polysemic nature of the word 
corruption used therein: this word, when used in law in relation to 
preventive activities, refers to corruption in the broadest sense, as covering 
the various situations in which, during the course of public duties, an 
individual abuses the power granted to him in order to obtain private 
advantages”; when used in relation to criminally significant offences, it 
refers to the technical and legal clarifications set out in the Criminal Code, 
from Art. 314 onwards.
26 M. Clarich, B.G. Mattarella, La prevenzione della corruzione, in B.G. Mattarella, 
M. Pelissero (edited by), La legge anticorruzione. Prevenzione e repressione 
della corruzione, Turin, 2013, p. 61; M.C. Romano, Il ruolo e le competenze di 
ANAC sui contratti pubblici, in M. D’Alberti (edited by), Corruzione e pubblica 
amministrazione, Naples, 2017, p. 769.
27 M. Clarich, B.G. Mattarella, La prevenzione della corruzione, loc. ult. cit.
28 ANAC, PNA 2013, Rome, 2014, p. 13.
29 On the difficulty of attributing legal value to the “broad” notion of 
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the need for action to prevent corruption offences. Instead, 
bearing in mind that the agreed definition of a corruption 
offence in the sociological sense of the term is based on 
turning the powers granted by a mandate towards a private, 
individual interest (therefore essentially in giving priority, in 
a situation where there is a conflict of interest30, to the private 
interest at the expense of the public one), prevention consists 
of preparing instruments that allow the behaviour of the 
person or the entity to which he/she/it belongs to be guided 
towards always prioritising the public interest. Prevention, 
therefore, intervenes prior to an offence (by omission or 
deliberate) involving illegality (including criminal acts) or 
irregularity, when there are “situations in which the risk is 
merely potential”, situations therefore “where it is necessary 
to use measures to “remove” the risk, using options that 
sometimes completely disregard individual actions31.
3. The clause on respect for national sovereignty
First of all, it is worth noting the explicit limit that 
convention norms encounter, independently of the fact 
that they emanate from a classical type of international 
organisation, rather than from one focused on integration, 
which, for the regional context in which the Italian system 
is located, is the European Union32. 
corruption, see R. Cantone, E. Carloni, La prevenzione della corruzione e la 
sua Autorità, in Diritto pubblico, 2017, p. 911.
30 On the notion of conflict of interests, on the types of the same, on the 
difficulty of recognising their existence, see OECD, Guidelines for Managing 
Conflict of Interest in the Public Service, Paris, 2003; OECD, EU, Conflict of 
interest policies and practices in nine EU Member States: a comparative review, 
SIGMA Paper No. 36.
31 R. Cantone, Il sistema della prevenzione della corruzione in Italia, in Diritto penale 
contemporaneo,  27 November 2017, par. 3.
32 On the typology of forms of institutionalised international cooperation (and 
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In the United Nations Convention, as in the Treaty 
on the European Union, there is a general clause according 
to which “States Parties shall carry out their obligations 
under this Convention in a manner consistent with the 
principle of sovereign equality and territorial integrity of 
States and that of non-intervention in the domestic affairs 
of other States”33. This norm is perfectly established in the 
structural principles of the international community’s legal 
system as explained above: respect for the national integrity 
and domestic competence of each State, in the context of 
cooperation based on equal status among all States34. The 
perception of the potential pervasiveness of the obligations 
involved in ratifying the Convention, however, led the 
States to add specific clauses, concerning the same purpose, 
as individual norms of the Convention. In the Chapter 
dedicated to “Preventive Measures”, we see repeatedly that 
the State assumes the obligation concerned “in accordance 
with the fundamental principles of its legal system”: this is 
applicable to the norms that pertain to the type of strategy 
and State policy 35, which require the establishment of a 
“body or bodies, as appropriate, that prevent corruption”36; which 
make provisions with regard to the organisation of national 
public authorities37, as well as integrity, honesty and the 
responsibility of public sector workers38; which establish 
on the resulting legal differences they create for the Member States) see 
for all, U. Draetta, Principi di diritto delle organizzazioni internazionali, Padua, 
20103, p. 79 et seq. 
33 Arts. 2, paragraph 1, UNCAC. 
34 An “interpretative note” was adopted in the preparatory work and affirms that 
this consistency and the interpretation of the notion of reserved dominion 
as accepted by the United Nations:   A/58/422/Add.1, para. 10.
35 Art. 5, paragraph 1, UNCAC.
36 Art. 6, paragraph 1, UNCAC.
37 Art. 7, paragraph 1-2, UNCAC.
38 Art. 8, paragraph 1, UNCAC.
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criteria for the management of public contracts and public 
finances39; which require transparency40 including in the 
financing of political parties and candidatures41 and, by 
promoting information sharing methods42, to take measures 
to ensure the integrity of the judicial function43, to organise 
and strengthen the national regulations on accounting, 
including through measures to promote transparency44 and 
to promote the participation of civil society in State action 
against corruption45. Only the provision on the measures to 
assume to combat the laundering of “dirty money” establish 
a formula that is less protective of national sovereignty, 
establishing an obligation for all the different authorities 
of each State affected by this activity to collaborate at 
the national and international level “within the conditions 
prescribed by its domestic law”46.
As mentioned previously, in the Treaty on European 
Union also there is a general clause according to which the 
“Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the 
Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their 
fundamental structures, political and constitutional”47. This 
formula is accompanied by clarifications that monitor, from 
other specific contexts, the actions of the organisation with 
regard to other Member States, requiring that in exercising 
its duties (even very invasive ones) it must operate in 
39 Art. 9, paragraph 1, UNCAC.
40 Art. 7, paragraph 4, UNCAC.
41 Art. 7, paragraph 3, UNCAC.
42 Art. 10, paragraph 1, UNCAC.
43 Art. 12, paragraph 1, UNCAC.
44 Art. 12, paragraph 1, UNCAC.
45 Art. 13, paragraph 1, UNCAC.
46 Art. 14, paragraph 1, lett. b), UNCAC.
47 Art. 4, paragraph 2, TEU.
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accordance with the principle of conferral48, intervening in 
the sectors that are not under its exclusive jurisdiction “only 
if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot 
be sufficiently achieved by the Member States”49, limiting 
the content and the form of action to what does “not exceed 
what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties”50. 
Therefore, the duty of the Union is to “carry out actions 
to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the 
Member States” in terms of “administrative cooperation”51 
(considered a “matter of common concern” for Member 
States and the Union52) it must respect national sovereignty 
within the rigorous limits described. The difference with 
the set of measures established in the Merida Convention is 
that the defence against external “interference” is offered, in 
the latter, against the other contracting States, in the Union 
against the latter.
The OECD Convention on combating bribery establishes 
that the State must comply «as may be necessary, in accordance 
with its legal principles»53, or «within the framework of its law»54.
The protection of national sovereignty offered by the 
Council of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention on Corruption 
is very vague, in the sense that in almost every provision it 
uses the phrase “Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other 
measures as may be necessary (…)”55. In the Civil Law Convention 
on Corruption, developed in the same institutional context, 
there is no trace of a similar filter to protect sovereignty.
48 Art. 5, paragraph 2 TEU.
49 Art. 5, paragraph 3, TEU.
50 Art. 5, paragraph 4, TEU.
51 Art. 6, lett. g), TFEU.
52 Art. 197, paragraph 1, TFEU.
53 Art. 2.  
54 Art. 8, paragraph 1.  
55 Arts. 1-15.
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Therefore, there is a different level of “defence” for 
national legal systems in terms of the impact of convention 
provisions. This seems to depend on two different factors. 
Firstly, where the group of States that participates in the 
convention is homogeneous (so limited in number), the 
agreement of the States on the legal content is more easily 
obtained and there are fewer reciprocal suspicions. This 
is why the regional European conventions contain fewer 
“defences” (or sometimes none) compared to international 
conventions. Secondly, when an agreement is not limited 
exclusively to establishing reciprocal rights and obligations 
between States, but also aims to create an international 
body to govern material activities (even in competition 
with Member States), its greater potential influence and 
invasiveness is recognised in terms of national sovereignty 
and, therefore, the agreement itself is equipped with 
provisions that very accurately demarcate how the body 
itself must exercise its duties.
4. The mobilisation of different components of 
the State community, at both the domestic 
level and the international level
Moving on now to discuss whether there is an 
international model for preventing corruption and how it 
works, let us examine the strategies, methods, measures 
and instruments that are identified by the community 
(international and regional) of States to achieve effective 
State action to prevent corruption.
The first important point concerns the overall strategy 
that States are asked to implement. To combat a phenomenon 
considered serious, not only for the quantity of financial 
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resources drained56, but primarily for the pervasive, 
systematic and widespread nature of these unlawful 
practices57, we clearly need a strategy, which of course uses 
laws, procedures and institutions, but most of all one that 
can influence the cultural fabric of the community in which 
the phenomenon has become embedded. This involves the 
mobilisation of all the forces present in society, to direct them 
towards a different lifestyle, or rather (to use an expression 
used in an international recommendation) the construction 
of “a coherent and comprehensive public-integrity system”58.
Evidence of this necessary general mobilisation of 
positive energy from a whole society and legal community 
comes in the form of the requests that emerge, for example, 
from the intergovernmental collaboration that occurs at 
the technical level within the OECD59; from the context of 
the Council of Europe60; from the European Union where 
there is disapproval towards fragmented anti-corruption 
measures that are inadequate for producing visible results 
56 The severity of the phenomenon from a financial perspective was, for 
example, emphasised by Christine Lagarde, Director of the International 
Monetary Fund, who spoke (in the Report presented at the annual World 
Bank conference on 12 October 2017) of a “cost” resulting from corruption 
of 1.5 trillion dollars per year. See also the results reported in European 
Commission, Special Eurobarometer 470 – Corruption, October 2017, http://
ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinio. The World Bank, Worldwide 
Governance Indicators, Washington, 2018. 
57 On the severity of the phenomenon in the context of the rule of law, see 
supra, note 4.
58 Point II of the Recommendations of 26 January 2017 C(2017)5 on Public 
Integrity, intended to create a public system of integrity; they substitute the 
Recommendations of 1998 on Improving Ethical Conduct in the Public Service.
59 Infra, paragraphs 5 and 6.
60 Already in 1994 the Committee of Ministers had adopted a resolution, 
Res(94)24, Twenty Principles  for the Fight against Corruption, which suggests 
a holistic approach to combating corruption. Along the same lines, see also 
Basic Anti-Corruption Concepts. A training Manual, Strasbourg, 2015.
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unless they are used as part of a global approach61; and from 
the previously mentioned United Nations Convention against 
Corruption.
In particular, the latter is intended to promote and 
strengthen measures to prevent corruption effectively and 
efficiently; to encourage, facilitate and maintain international 
cooperation, including through training activities; to promote 
integrity (including by making public administration 
accountable) as well as through the correct management 
of public affairs62. As a consequence, the norms contained 
in the Convention chapter entitled “Preventive Measures” 
establish that the contracting States must take action firstly 
by investing energy in all the components of each national 
community: the public apparatus, the financial-productive 
component and civil society. 
With regard to the national public administration, each 
State must intervene with measures capable of affecting 
the organisational structures, in order to promote integrity, 
transparency, the competency of the public apparatus and 
the individual responsibility of each of its components63. 
Attention should also be paid to the judiciary and the 
investigative services, whose independence and integrity 
must be protected including through the adoption of codes 
of conduct64. 
61 European Commission, Thematic factsheet for the European Semester. Fight 
against corruption, 22 November 2017, p. 8.
62  Art. 5. D. Vlassis, J. Pilgrim, The United Nations Convention against Corruption: 
a framework for addressing common challenges in identifying incentives for private 
sector integrity, in F. Bonelli, M. Mantovani (eds.), Corruzione nazionale e 
internazionale, Milan, 2014, pp. 253-254.
63  Art. 9-10. In more detail paragraphs 5 and 6; for transparency, paragraph 
7.
64 Art. 11.
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The Convention then deals with the private sector in its 
duplicate version. In relation to the productive component of 
the country, it obliges contracting States to prevent corruption 
by strengthening regulations in relation to accounting and 
auditing; by promoting and preparing norms and procedures 
intended to both preserve the integrity of private entities 
(with codes of conduct and measures to prevent conflicts 
of interest, also providing if necessary, and for a reasonable 
period of time, a suspension of professional activities)65, both 
in order to establish good practices in commercial relations 
with each other and with the State; through transparency, 
which for example requires the effective property of private 
entities to be transparent66. The State must ban company 
expenses that amount to bribes from being deducted from 
taxes67. To protect the integrity of the private sector, the State 
must also equip itself with a system of sanctions (criminal, 
civil, administrative) that are effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive, a formula which has become standard in 
international conventions. The Convention promotes the 
adoption of regulations that protect public contracts, which 
will be discussed in more detail later on, with anti-corruption 
measures that reward transparency and competition68 and 
65 Infra, paragraph 6.
66 Art. 12, paragraph 1. In this context, starting with the St Petersburg 
Declaration and the G20 session where Australia had the Presidency and 
Italy the Co-Presidency (2014), the international community has been 
working towards property transparency in order to stop the illegal economy 
from entering into the legal economy, through among other things, the 
adoption of High-Level Principles on Beneficial Ownership Transparency, the 
creation of a framework for automatically exchanging tax information (the 
so-called AEOI, prepared by the OECD), EU Directive 20157849 (Art. 29), the 
recommendations adopted by the Financial Action Task Force. See FATF 
Report on the G20 Beneficial Ownership, September 2016; T.I., Just to Show: 
Reviewing G20 Promises on Beneficial Ownership, 2015.
67 Art. 12, paragraph 4.
68 Art. 9 See infra, paragraph 8.
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discourage the laundering of money generated from illegal 
activities69. 
In relation to the second formulation for the private 
sector, the Convention requires that the contracting State 
should employ initiatives to involve civil society, stimulating 
citizens, communities of people and non-governmental 
organisations to participate in anti-corruption activities 
by making them more aware of the overall problem of 
corruption, transparency of decision-making processes, 
their participation in the latter, promotion of freedom of 
expression, research, information and access to the public 
bodies in charge of preventing corruption70. 
Furthermore, in an area of regional international 
cooperation marked by a unique process of economic, 
social and legal integration of national systems (so in a very 
different legal context to the one presented by the United 
Nations Convention against Corruption), the approach is 
entirely similar: reference need only be made to the contents 
of the European Commission Communication in relation 
to a European Union comprehensive policy against corruption71.
The different international legal contexts involved in 
the fight against corruption to which reference has been 
made (UN, EU, OECD, Council of Europe) use, in short, a 
similar strategy that tends to combine norms with a general 
scope capable of achieving a dissuasive system effect and 
sector focused norms intended to raise the cost of corrupt 
actions72.
69 Art. 14.
70 Art. 13.
71 COM(2003) 317 final.
72 Also F. Di Cristina, Prevenire la corruzione e l’illegalità negli appalti pubblici: 
verso una nuova via europea, in A. Del Vecchio, P. Severino (editors), Il contrasto 
alla corruzione nel diritto interno e nel diritto internazionale, Padua, 2014, pp. 
328-330.
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There is also a demand from the international arena in 
relation to the need to ensure coordination of strategy and 
coordination of action within the State with action outside 
the State. This request is expressed, for example, by the 
Merida Convention provision that requires collaboration 
between States (both bilateral and multilateral, including in 
the context of international and regional organisations) in 
order to promote and implement measures devised within 
the anti-corruption strategy prepared at the national level73. 
In the European Union there is an express clause (which 
also exclusively declares an implicit obligation in any 
international agreement74), which establishes the obligation 
for each Member State and the Union to respect and assist 
each other in fulfilling the tasks that result from the Treaties75.
5. The need for institutions (independent and 
competent) dedicated to preventing corrup-
tion 
It is usual for international treaties concerning activities 
for combating crime to include an obligation for contracting 
States to establish dedicated institutions. With regard to anti-
corruption, the “criminal law” Convention prepared in the 
context of the Council of Europe76 requires compliance with 
this obligation in order to coordinate suppressive action77; for 
73 Art. 5, paragraph 4.
74 The Vienna Convention on the law of the treaties establishes the obligation 
for international agreements to be performed in good faith (Art. 26), creating 
a genuine principle of international law.
75 The principle of sincere cooperation is contained in Article 4, paragraph 3, 
TEU.
76 Supra, note 5.
77 Art. 20, read in correlation with Art. 21.
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the same purpose again, as mentioned previously, there is 
the obligation established by Articles 36 and 46 of the Merida 
Convention78. On the subject of preventing corruption, 
this States that “Each State Party shall, in accordance with the 
fundamental principles of its legal system, ensure the existence of 
a body or bodies, as appropriate, that prevent corruption”79. The 
first suggestion that is derived from international law is that 
(in the context of respect for domestic jurisdiction recognised as 
a corollary of State sovereignty80) centres of authority should 
be established for “implementing the policies referred to in Article 
5 of (…) [the] Convention[81] and, where appropriate, overseeing 
and coordinating the implementation of those policies” and 
“increasing and disseminating knowledge about the prevention 
of corruption”82.
The second suggestion contained in the Convention 
concerns the quality of these bodies: these must have the 
“necessary independence (…) to enable the body or bodies to 
carry out its or their functions effectively and free from any undue 
influence”83. More than a few words are required to discuss 
78 Art. 36 requires contracting States to ensure the existence of national law 
enforcement authorities; Art. 46 establishes the obligation on the same to 
identify a central authority in charge of criminal judicial cooperation.
79 Art. 6, paragraph 1. In this context, the existence of a precise “legal necessity” 
has been discussed: see S. Valaguzza, La regolazione strategica dell’Autorità 
Nazionale Anticorruzione, in Riv. Reg. Mer., 2016, especially par. 2.
80 In this context see supra, para. 3.
81 Art. 5, in relation to preventive anti-corruption policies and practices, 
affirms that each State party must develop, implement or maintain effective, 
coordinated anti-corruption policies; endeavour to establish and promote 
effective practices for preventing corruption and periodically assess the 
legal instruments and administrative measures used to determine their 
adequacy for the task. Furthermore, State Parties must collaborate to 
promote and implement these measures. 
82 Art. 6, paragraph 1, lett. a-b), UNCAC.
83 Art. 6, paragraph 2. Also confirming the character of independence is the 
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the non-technical use of the concept of independence, but 
that is not the aim of this paper: suffice to say that this 
characteristic, in my opinion, should more properly be 
understood as neutrality, or rather impartiality, in relation 
to the areas of interest involved in the activity assigned to 
these bodies84.
A third suggestion (written for educational purposes, in 
order to teach how to ensure, at least in terms of legislation, 
that the entity or entities in charge of prevention have a 
statute of independence) can be found in the provision 
according to which “The necessary material resources and 
specialized staff, as well as the training that such staff may require 
to carry out their functions, should be provided”85. It can be 
deduced that independence can be ensured only where there 
are adequate financial resources and numerically sufficient 
human capital, as well as persons with appropriate training 
in order to ensure, through their duties, the effectiveness of 
national preventive activity. 
The practices of the States that are party to the Merida 
Convention in relation to compliance with the norm that 
requires the establishment of bodies dedicated to preventing 
corruption are very varied. Broadly speaking, three different 
models of compliance with the convention norm can be 
identified, through the establishment of: entities that merely 
Legislative Guide for the Implementation of the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption, New York, 2006, para. 52. See also Resolution 5/4, Follow-up to the 
Marrakech Declaration on the Prevention of Corruption, adopted at the UNCAC 
State Parties Conference, point 12; and by Resolution 6/6, Resolution 6/6 
Follow-up to the Marrakech declaration on the prevention of corruption, adopted 
at the UNCAC State Parties Conference, point 3.
84 For more detail on this see N. Parisi, Il ruolo dell’Autorità nazionale 
anticorruzione, in L. Foffani – D. Limone – V. Mongillo – G. Piperata (editors), 
Manuale dell’anticorruzione, Bologna, in the course of publication. 
85 Art. 6, paragraph 2.
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coordinate other bodies and national authorities; public 
institutions that contribute towards preventing corruption 
even if they are not specifically intended for this purpose; 
and bodies created specifically for this purpose, which 
contribute towards preventing corruption as a specific part 
of their duties86.
GRECO has considered the levels of independence 
of national anti-corruption authorities on many occasions 
87, at times focusing on the need for adequate “financial and 
personnel resources”88; on the effectiveness of the powers 
granted to them89, on their collaboration with other State 
institutions in order to optimise the performance of their 
duties90. In relation to the Italian National Anti-corruption 
Authority, it commented that it “is playing a most valuable 
role with its proactive and determined leadership”91. 
86 On the different ways that States have adapted to the convention provision, 
see K. Hussmann, H. Hechler, M. Peñailillo, Institutional Arrangements for 
Corruption Prevention: Considerations on the Implementation of the United 
Nations Convention against Corruption Article 6, in U4 Issue 2009:4, Anti-
Corruption Resources Centre Chr. Michelsen Institute; L. de Sousa, Anti-
Corruption Agencies: Between Empowerment and Irrelevance, EUI Working 
Paper RSCAS 2009/08; PNUD (Programme des Nations Unites pour le 
development), Guide des praticiens: Évaluation de la capacité des agencies anti-
corruption, 2011; J. Johnsøn, H. Hechler, L. de Sousa, H. Mathisen, How to 
monitor and evaluate anti-corruption agencies: Guidelines for agencies, donors, and 
evaluators, Anti-Corruption Resources Centre Chr. Michelsen Institute, U4 
Issue 2011:8.
87 On the recommendations adopted in the context of the 4th round of 
evaluation, see GRECO, Fourth Evaluation Round. Provisional Compilation of 
GRECO’s Recommendations (updated since GRECO 77), pp. 70-71.
88 Within the fourth round of peer review see Rec. XIX in relation to 
Macedonia; Rec. XIX in relation to Slovenia; Rec. XVI in relation to Georgia.
89 With reference to the fourth round of evaluation see Rec. XIII in relation to 
Serbia.
90 Again within the fourth round of peer review see Rec. V in relation to 
Ukraine; Rec. I in relation to Lithuania.
91 GRECO, Evaluation Report – Italy (in the context of the Fourth Evaluation 
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The OECD considers it to be “independent from the 
Government (…) gained a prominent role (…) on adopting 
and strengthening corruption-prevention measures (…)”92 
and capable of implementing international best practice in 
terms of supervision93.
5.1 Independent authorities and European 
Union Law
The European Union’s legal system, due to the primacy 
of its laws within national legal systems94, could represent 
Round), 19 January 2017, par. 2, according to which “The National 
Anticorruption Authority (so-called ANAC), the key coordinating body in 
Italy for corruption prevention and transparency of public administration 
purposes, is playing a most valuable role with its proactive and determined 
leadership. A broad Anticorruption Plan (2017-2019) is in the pipeline; 
it comprises multifaceted measures (publication of administrative 
information, rotation of personnel, strengthened control of conflicts of 
interest, monitoring of privatisation and externalisation of public services)”.
92 OECD Economic Survey – Italy, April 2019, p. 32.
93 See the Report (of 18 December 2014) on the governance system for contracts 
and on the methodology of preventive control of legitimacy; and the Interim Report 
(of 30 March 2015) in which it is noted that “The experience (…) represents 
a model of integrated controls and institutional synergies that enable an 
organised response from the institutions to organised crime and corruption” 
(p. 4) and “the OECD believes that certain elements of best practice that 
emerged from the agreement with ANAC could be a source of inspiration 
for promoting the integrity of other large infrastructure projects (…)” (p. 
10).
94 On this topic the reference to the intense and remarkable scientific 
production of Antonio Ruggeri is mandatory. Limiting the quotations 
to the most recent studies see:  Primato del diritto dell’Unione europea in 
fatto di tutela dei diritti fondamentali?, in Quaderni costituzionali, 2015, p. 931 
et seq.; Primato del diritto sovranazionale versus identità costituzionale? (alla 
ricerca dell’araba fenice costituzionale: i “controlimiti”), in Forum di quaderni 
costituzionali, 2016; Il primato del diritto dell’Unione sul diritto nazionale: lo scarto 
tra il modello e l’esperienza e la ricerca dei modi della loro possibile ricomposizione, in 
Consultaonline, 2016, III fasc.;  Corte costituzionale, corti europee, giudici comuni: 
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a way to strengthen the independent nature of the national 
anti-corruption authorities.  However, this offers only 
indirect ideas95. 
Firstly, with regard to the public tenders sector, 
there is a clear similarity in objectives between European 
law on public tenders, which protects the par condicio and 
competition, and anti-corruption law, for example, the Italian 
law inserted into the Public Tenders Code96 partially for 
the purpose of avoiding the risk of corruption97. However, 
there are no provisions in the Community directives that 
require the establishment of ad hoc national authorities. The 
connection and interaction between fighting corruption 
through prevention, public contracts and, more generally, 
le aporie di una costruzione giurisprudenziale, in Consultaonline, 2018, III fasc.; 
Costituzione e rapporti interordinamentali, tra limiti e controlimiti, dal punto di 
vista della Corte costituzionale, in Ordine internazionale e diritti umani, 2019, p. 
507 et seq.; Dopo Taricco: identità costituzionale e primate della Costituzione o 
della Corte costituzionale?, in La legislazione penale, 4.2.2019, p. 1 et seq. 
95 In this context, administrative scientific literature has shown a synergy 
between norms on anti-corruption and those inherent to public tendering 
procedures. Even the need to “improve the efficiency of public spending” 
set out in the preambles of the 2014 directives on tenders and concessions, 
encourages the use of anti-corruption policies, to protect values already 
recognised under European law: this is the line of reasoning proposed by 
S. Valaguzza, Normativa sull’evidenza pubblica e sull’anticorruzione: prospettive 
a confronto, in various authors, La nuova disciplina dei contratti pubblici tra 
esigenze di semplificazione, rilancio dell’economia e contrasto alla corruzione, 
Documents from the 61st Administrative Sciences Conference, Milan, 2016, 
especially p. 703 et seq., which identifies, even though indirectly, a source 
of legitimacy for the anti-corruption Authority in European Law.
96 Legislative Decree no. 50/2016.
97 Consider, for example, the norms on conflicts of interest, contained in the 
2014 directives on tenders and concessions (see, in particular, premise 
16 and Art. 24 of Directive 24/2014/EU), the aim of which is par condicio 
concorrentium, but also to prevent the commission of corruption offences. 
The similarity of the objectives is emphasised in S. Valaguzza, Normativa 
sull’evidenza pubblica e sull’anticorruzione: prospettive a confronto, ibid, pp. 703 
-705.
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the integrity of the national public administration (which 
even though found in the European Union directives on 
public contracts98 or rather in other anti-corruption measures 
adopted by the European Union99) does not, in short, 
translate into the construction of a form of administration 
that sees institutional dialogue between several authorities 
each belonging to its own legal system in accordance with the 
“European regulatory partnership”100 or the  “network”101, as 
98 EU Directives 23, 24, 25/2914, implemented in Italy with the aforementioned 
Legislative Decree no. 50/2016.
99 This refers, purely by way of example, to the “package” of anti-corruption 
measures adopted by the European Commission, Doc. COM(2011) 308 final; 
and the Report by the same Commission on the fight against corruption in the 
European Union, Doc. COM(2014) 38 final. See in addition: the Convention 
on the fight against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or 
officials of Member States of the European Union, adopted by the Council of the 
European Union on 25 May 1997; the Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 
the Council of the European Union, of 22 July 2003, on combating corruption in 
the private sector; the Convention on the Protection of the European Communities’ 
Financial Interests adopted by the Council of the European Union on 26 July 
1995, completed by three protocols (the first, dated 27 September 1996, 
on  corruption of Community officials; the second (dated 19 June 1997) on the 
responsibility of legal entities and associated sanctions, money laundering and 
confiscation, cooperation between the services of the European Commission and 
Member States, as well as data protection; the third (of 29 November 1996) on 
the jurisdiction of the EU Court of Justice to interpret the Convention through 
preliminary ruling; these conventional rules should have been replaced by 
the directive 2017/1371, 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the European 
Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law. 
100 According to C. Franchini and G. Vesperini, III. L’organizzazione, in S. 
Cassese (editor), Istituzioni di diritto amministrativo, Milan, 20124 , pp. 126-127, 
the model is reproduced when “a structural and functional integration of 
independent national authorities is achieved (…) [,] cases of administrative 
integration (…) related to the phenomenon of the emergence of numerous 
administrative apparatuses common to Member States and the European 
Union, designed as systems composed of elements that complement each 
other”.
101 This situation was explained very clearly in legal terms: “Integration 
between significant markets depends (…) essentially on integration 
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has already happened or has simply been proposed for issues 
that fall within other sectors not covered by the exclusive 
competence of the Union. 
In this context, we should note the complex institutional 
systems created to ensure the confidentiality of personal 
data102, to protect internal market competition103 and to 
manage electronic communications104. Relevant in this context 
is the proposal (in the literature) to establish a network 
system of administration (that includes both the Union 
and its Member States in fighting the laundering of illegal 
revenue)105; as well as the proposal (made by the European 
Parliament, but not accepted by the Commission) to establish 
a European Authority for the protection of whistleblowers, 
evidently in partnership with the national authorities already 
between businesses (supply) but even more on integration between public 
authorities, including those belonging to different Member States (demand) 
located in national contexts, and among these and those that are institutions 
of the European Union (…) according to a system of competences organised 
as a network, where it is the relationship of integration between national 
and European administrations that promotes the development of systems 
capable of achieving a shall we say balanced dismantling of the pre-existing 
administrative nationalisms”: R. Cavallo Perin, L’organizzazione delle pubbliche 
amministrazioni e l’integrazione europea, in R. Cavallo Perin, A. Police and 
F. Saitta (editors), L’organizzazione della pubblica amministrazione tra Stato 
nazionale e integrazione europea, Florence (Florence Univ. Press), 2016, p. 7; 
see also pp. 20-23.
102 See Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 and the regulation (which 
substituted it) (EU) 2016/679 of 27 April 2016. For a discussion on this see N. 
Parisi, Anac and the Italian Model for the prevention of corruption. Best practices, 
challenges and gaps, in G. Bellantuono and F. Lara, Legal Conservations between 
Italy and Brazil, Trento (Università degli studi di Trento), 2018, p. 17 et seq. 
103 See Regulation 1/2003/EC of 16 December 2002. See S. Cassese, L’Autorità 
garante della concorrenza e del mercato nel “sistema” delle autorità indipendenti, 
in Giornale dir. amm., no. 1, 2011, pp. 102-104.
104 Directive 2002/21/EC of 7 March 2002.
105  D. Masciandaro, Un’autorità europea contro il riciclaggio, in Il Sole 24 Ore, 16 
July 2018.
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in charge of this task106. In this latter context, the directive 
that requires the harmonised protection of workers who 
report offences starting from within their place of work 
(regardless of whether it is private or public sector) is 
undoubtedly positive. However, the parliamentary provision 
of a specific body capable of working in synergy with the 
national institutions would have given added value to the 
attempt to harmonise the national systems for protecting 
whistleblowers. The proposal of the European Parliament 
had and has, furthermore, the merit of having been the first 
inspiration for a European policy on harmonising national 
anti-corruption action through an institution that without a 
doubt belongs to this sector. However, the provision of an 
institutional system of networked administration (even in 
the limited context of a single anti-corruption institution) 
would also have had the effect of strengthening the role 
of the national authorities involved, whose existence and 
competence would have found European legitimacy.  
Finally, the Italian Anti-Corruption Authority could 
be anchored to community law in relation both to public 
tenders and to whistleblower protection, to the extent that 
it was assigned a role of governance over an integrated 
market of European dimensions107, of which the national 
market is only a small part. In particular, the specific role 
granted to this institution by the Public Contracts Code in 
terms of dispute resolution seems relevant. If in fact we 
consider the “remedies directives”108 we can appreciate 
106 Art. 7: Doc. 3 May 2016, http://bit.ly/1rQJtRy. In its own resolution, the 
European Parliament suggests that the European authority should provide 
opinions to the national authorities and the European institutions, and that 
it should promote the harmonisation of good practices in the Union and in 
Member States with regard to whistleblowing. 
107 Art. 212 Public Contracts Code.
108 Directive 2007/66/EC of 11 December 2007.
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how it allows Members States some discretion in relation to 
identifying types of remedy, not even excluding that non-
judicial methods may be established109. This directive was 
implemented in Italy primarily through the Administrative 
Process Code. But even the last Contracts Code makes a 
contribution to the extent that, for example, it includes 
dispute resolution methods alternative to those that are 
specifically judicial. The binding opinion under Art. 211, 
para. 1, of the Code can be read in this context, to the extent 
that the parties are both entitled to ask the National Anti-
Corruption Authority not only for an interpretation, but 
also for a pre-litigation solution to a legal issue concerning 
an administrative measure issued110. In this context, one 
could also read Art. 211, para. 1bis, of the same Code, which 
empowers ANAC to legitimately challenge administrative 
measures that it deems unlawful: the role covered by this 
procedure consists of resolving the root cause of a problem 
before the parties take legal action.
In relation to whistleblower protection, it is beyond 
doubt that, when the Law 179/2017 will be amended to 
adapt the Italian legal system to the EU directive, the Anti-
corruption Authority will be the governance body in the 
matter also for the European “internal market”111.
109 Art. 2 dir. cit.
110 For more on this issue, see also C. Benetazzo, I nuovi poteri “regolatori” e 
di precontenzioso dell’ANAC nel sistema europeo delle Autorità indipendenti, in 
federalismi.it, 28 February 2018, footnote 59.
111 On the role of Italian whistleblowing legislation to improve an effective 
preventive action see supra, footnote 19.
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5.2 Independent authorities and national Cons-
titutions
A different important means of building a solid 
guarantee of independence to the advantage of national 
anti-corruption authorities could be offered by national 
constitutions, if the principle of the existence and/or 
legitimacy to exercise duties could be found within them. 
In this sense, once again, we can think in terms of 
ANAC, which was established with a law expressly passed 
to fulfil international obligations. Law 190/2012 starts, in 
fact, by stating that “[i]n fulfilment of Article 6 of the United 
Nations Convention against Corruption (…) and Articles 20 
and 21 of the Criminal Law Convention against Corruption 
(…), this law identifies, in the national context, the National 
Anti-Corruption Authority and the other bodies assigned to 
perform, with methods suitable for ensuring coordinated 
action, activities to control, prevent and fight corruption and 
illegality in public administration”112. 
It follows that the evoked conventional rule (rectius: 
the Italian law that contains the order to implement the 
same) is categorised as “interposed provision” (between 
the Constitution and the ordinary law of the Parliament) 
pursuant to Art. 117, para. 1, of the Constitutional Charter113. 
In legal terms the consequence is that subsequent laws can 
easily intervene to amend the laws on the existence, role, 
112 Art. 1, para. 1, Law no. 190/2012.
113 Art. 117, para. 1, Italian Constitution. See the “twin” judgments of the 
Constitutional Court nos. 348 and 349/2007. On the constitutional legitimacy 
of ANAC, S. Valaguzza also offers a comment, La regolazione strategica 
dell’Autorità Nazionale Anticorruzione, in Riv. reg. mercati, 2016/1, p. 17. About 
the primacy of international agreements and European law pursuant to the 
Italian Constitution see supra, footnote 19. About the primacy of customary 
law pursuant the Italia Constitution see infra, para. 5.
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competences and functions of the Authority, but without 
these legislative interventions removing the obligation 
assumed with the order to implement the Merida Convention 
within the Italian legal system: the existence of one or more 
anti-corruption bodies equipped with the guarantees of 
independence required by international law must always 
be ensured. 
The guarantee of such compliance lies within 
the assessment of constitutionality exercisable by the 
Constitutional Court, which can be asked to evaluate 
the conformity of new laws with the provisions of the 
Constitution, according to which “legislative authority is 
exercised (...) in accordance with the Constitution, as well as 
with the commitments arising from the European Union’s 
legal system and from international obligations”114.
5.3 The benefit derived from the existence of 
national entities for preventing corruption
There are many advantages to be derived from 
compliance with the convention norms that ask States to 
establish dedicated anti-corruption authorities. I will discuss 
them based on the few years’ experience gained since ANAC 
has been in operation. The Authority obtained accreditation 
in the Registry, held by the United Nations under the United 
Nations Office for Drugs and Crime115.
The activity that the Authority performs to fulfil 
the normative provision cited is not so much intended to 
114 Art. ult. cit. 
115 Pursuant to Art. 6, para. 3, UNCAC, the existence of national entities 
created for the purpose of prevention pursuant to the Convention must be 
communicated to the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime, UNODC, 
the UN office responsible for the Registry of accreditations. 
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represent Italy at the international level; the traditional 
government diplomatic delegations would suffice for that 
purpose. The Authority is rather associated with these 
delegations (in the contexts, for example, of the United 
Nations, the OECD, the Council of Europe, the European 
Union, the Open Government Partnership, the G20 and 
the G7, limiting the list to the most important for the issue 
under discussion here), enjoying within them guarantees of 
independence, since there its presence is exclusively to cover 
a technical role: its participation is essential for enhancing 
the national contribution to the international debate with its 
specific competences, especially when it involves identifying 
the best contents to include in the international norms in the 
process of adoption. 
Again, the Authority uses these occasions to share 
and exchange information, data and knowledge on anti-
corruption methodologies and practices in the broadest 
sense, as understood in our legal system also, with other 
similar national counterparts116.  
Thanks to this structure, the national authority is also 
able to represent and maintain, at the international level, the 
specific details of the domestic system within the numerous 
working groups, including those that draft the contents of 
binding laws, contributing also to disseminating any best 
practices that the “domestic system” is able to prepare within 
the legal system: this is what happened, for example in Italy, 
by express recognition by the OECD, with the procedures 
116 Following on from the normative idea contained Art. 5, paragraph 4, 
UNCAC, in parallel with the work of GRECO, for example, a network 
of national anti-corruption authorities was created (Šibenik Declaration 
16 October 2018), with the task of identifying the best national practices 
on preventing corruption, organising consistently and codifying them 
into “manuals” for national administrations to use, to better fulfil the 
recommendations issued by GRECO to each contracting party.
NICOLETTA PARISI 431
Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos | Belo Horizonte | n. 119 | pp. 397-447 | jul./dez. 2019
implemented by Art. 30 of Decree Law no. 90/2014 for the 
purpose of Expo Milan 2015117. 
In the domestic context, it is clear enough what 
advantages can be derived for the “domestic system” 
from the role performed by such an authority in terms of 
international relations and what implications arise from 
the resulting responsibilities. Firstly, in fulfilling its duties, 
the Authority is better able to transfer into its deliberations 
a correct understanding of both the literal provision of the 
norm that it contributed to setting at the inter-governmental 
level, and the purpose that it intends to pursue, thus 
ensuring a more complete adherence to the international 
obligations should it adopt measures with either a general 
or an individual aim118. 
In the meantime, the fact of participating in the process 
that led to the adoption of international norms allows the 
national authority to usefully assist the domestic legislator 
in their transposition; to better evaluate (and consequently to 
solicit) said national legislator towards a better legal structure 
in relation to antinomies, difficulties in interpretation and 
weaknesses in the national normative fabric119. 
A few more words are needed, precisely in relation to 
the last item identified (that is, the problems that the national 
legal system can present in relation to the actions required 
117 See the two Reports adopted by the OECD in December 2014 and March 
2015, published on www.anticorruzione.it.
118 If we consider the many and significant duties that the Italian National Anti-
Corruption Authority has assumed including in the fields of regulation, 
supervision, consultancy, we can better understand the usefulness of such 
a technical role.
119 In this area it is in Italy the contribution that ANAC provided, for example, 
with the adoption of Guidelines no. 6/2015 that made the application of 
Art. 1, paragraph 51, of the “Severino Law” on protecting whistleblowers 
less complex, and this facilitation is still happening today in relation to the 
new provisions on the issue adopted under Law no. 179/2017.
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by its participation in international relations), to underline 
the virtuous effect that derives from inter-governmental 
collaboration and more specifically, from the national 
anti-corruption authorities’ participation in the same. The 
majority of the obligations assumed within the international 
governmental organisations (mentioned earlier), which 
pertain to fighting corruption, implement the verification 
mechanisms of the convention requirements, which in 
part have already been discussed in relation to another 
context120. The peculiarity of these mechanisms consists in 
very constructive methods of control that aim, not so much 
to ascertain the precise responsibility for the violation of 
an obligation, but to guide the non-compliant State in 
subsequent steps towards a satisfactory level of compliance 
with the obligation itself. This system (called peer review 
since it is performed in the context of a reciprocal relationship 
between equals, the State parties to the individual convention 
system) allows “defects” to be highlighted in the national 
legal system without creating consequences for itself in 
terms of penalties: the recommendations that end each 
phase of the different evaluation rounds aim, reciprocally, to 
make suggestions to States regarding methods for fulfilling 
their convention obligations.  The participation of the 
prevention authorities in the evaluation “rounds” allows 
them to continuously introduce requirements arising from 
the international context into the national system (even in 
dialogue with the other institutions), thus contributing to 
the progressive process of adapting the latter to the former. 
120 Supra, para. 2.
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6. The contribution of customary international 
law
Finally, we can examine the question of whether this 
abundance of norms and practices for fighting corruption 
(and provide for domestic independent authorities) even in 
terms of prevention strategy constitutes the manifestation 
of the existence or the emergence of an international 
principle of customary nature (therefore of general scope, 
able to oblige all States to comply with it), and perhaps 
of a mandatory international norm intended to prohibit 
this sort of conduct as a crime against humanity, as some 
American121 and Indian122 literature is beginning to discuss. 
If so, the independence of national authorities would be 
strengthened, since jus cogens is mandatory for all States of 
the international Society, and – as we suggested - the fight 
against corruption greatly benefit from the presence of this 
kind of bodies, giving the fight itself greater effectiveness. 
According to the Italian Constitution123, the domestic legal 
system adapts automatically to customary law, that “enter” 
in it  with the rank of constitutional rules.
In the current state of international law, this latest 
suggestion does not seem tenable: not so much because there 
is no a legal qualification of corruption shared by States124, 
121 S. B. Starr, Extraordinary Crimes at Ordinary Times:  International Justice Beyond 
Crisis Situations, in 101 Northwestern Univ. Law Rev., No. 3, p. 1257 et seq.
122 Swami Nathan, Black money case, Treaty and International law (Jus 
Cogens). Bringing back Black Money can be thought of as part of Jus 
Cogens (international law), in https://www.pgurus.com/black-money-
case-treaty-and-international-law-jus-cogens, July 16, 2016.
123 Art. 10.
124 In the relevant Conventions there are important differences with regard 
to their subjective application,;but with regard to the material object of the 
offence they tend to give a similar, almost overlapping definition; there 
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but because the existence of an international ius cogens norm 
requires common consent on the severe deviance of the 
action contemplated by the same. Currently this consent does 
not seem likely, given the lack of widespread acceptance of 
this common consent. 
However, it is worth noting that there is a strong 
discussion about the creation of an international criminal court 
to fight grand corruption: such an institution presupposes 
the belief that corruption is a crime under international law. 
The debate was initially raised by Mark L. Wolf (US judge), 
during the 2012 St Petersburg International Legal Forum125. The 
proposal is in particular sustained by the Harvard Kennedy 
School of Government 126, the American Academy of Arts and 
Science e the III (Integrity Initiatives International), a non-
governmental organization founded (on 2016) with the aim 
to combat “grand corruption”. GOPAC (Global Organization 
is broad agreement, being the definition of corruption generally based 
on improper advantage, expressed very vaguely as “any undue advantage” 
(Arts. 2-3 Criminal Law Convention on Corruption; Art. 2 Civil Law Convention 
on Corruption; Art. 15 UNCAC). The 1997 OECD Convention stands out 
because it identifies the crime of transnational corruption (or international) 
in relation to economic transactions, which is a crime that must be included 
within the legal system of each contracting party (on this see S. Manacorda, 
La corruzione internazionale del pubblico agente, Naples, 1999). On the topic see 
also M. Arnone, S. Borlini, Corruption. Economic Analysis and International 
Law, Cheltenham-Northampton, 2014 pp. 314-321; A. Vannucci, L’evoluzione 
della corruzione in Italia: evidenza empirica, fattori facilitanti, politiche di contrasto, 
www.astrid-online.it/static/upload/protected/Vann/Vannucci.pdf.  
125 The Case for an International Anti-Corruption Court, Brookings Institution-
Governance Studies at Brookings, July 2014; An International Court to Fight 
Corruption: A Federal Judge Makes the Case (conference 2017-11-04); Statement: 
An International Anti-Corruption Court for Grand Corruption, pronounced at 
the 2016 London Anti-Corruption Summit.o   
126 Protagonist on the debate is R. Goldstone (South African magistrate 
and prosecutor at the International Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda); some ONGs –as Global Witness e Human Rights Watch – participate 
in it. 
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of Parliamentarians Against Corruption) adopted the Yogyakarta 
Declation (8 October 2015) that recommends that the United 
Nations (at point 6) consider the adoption of a supplementary 
protocol aimed at establishing an international criminal court 
for combating this type of conducts. 
This project is adversed by the Heritage Foundation127.
Instead, it is certainly a norm of general international 
law that obliges States to fight corruption offences, since the 
structure of the current international community attaches 
to them individually and collectively the responsibility 
of ensuring the orderly and legal pursuit of international 
relations including with and between private parties128. 
The existence of this norm on the structure of the 
international legal system is manifested by the willingness 
of States to fight offences that are contrary to this orderly and 
legal structure: this willingness is make evident, in fact, by 
the signing of so many treaties and the adoption of unilateral 
international norms of hard and soft law.
7. The necessary balance between the exercise 
of normative and regulatory activities in the 
context of preventing corruption
Everything said up to this point means that norms to 
comply with international and European law are adopted 
127 B.D. Schaefer, S. Groves, J.M. Roberts, Why the U.S. Should Oppose the Creation 
of an International Anti-Corruption Court, Backgrounder No. 2958, October 
2014).
128 P. Picone, Diritto internazionale dell’economia e costituzione economica 
dell’ordinamento internazionale, in P. Picone, G. Sacerdoti (eds.), Diritto 
internazionale dell’economia, Milan (Franco Angeli), 1982; G. Schwarezenberger, 
The Principles and Standards of International Economic Law, in Rec. des Cours, 
1966-1, p. 48.
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between States, along with procedures to ensure their 
effectiveness and efficiency. In this context, we must not 
ignore that increasingly often, in the most diverse areas, 
academics, many figures from the economic sphere and 
observatories (national and otherwise) of the methods 
that underlie the strategy of fighting corruption through 
prevention claim that the procedures implemented in this 
respect represent an element that contributes towards (if 
not causes) the inefficiency of the public sector system and 
business activity due to the costs, delays and restrictions 
they involve. The common factor in their reasoning is their 
affirmation of the pointlessness, or rather the unsuitability 
of the rules for changing the attitudes and the culture of a 
State and a nation.
On the contrary, I am deeply convinced that the law 
and, therefore, the procedures it implements, can be a 
powerful means for launching a different cultural approach 
from the present one with regard to corruption and the 
actions that sustain and feed it129: a cultural approach at the 
centre of which is an awareness of the severity of the damage 
caused by a degree of corruption as high and pervasive as 
the level many areas of the world have long experienced, 
causing not only economic damage, but also social and 
political, since it is likely to destroy the relationship of trust 
between government officials and institutions placed at the 
base of a constitutional legal system. A cultural approach, 
therefore, through which the “costs” of corruption are visible 
and there is an awareness of the reprehensible extent of the 
offences involved130.
129  See N. Bobbio, Dalla struttura alla funzione. Nuovi studi di teoria generale del 
diritto, Rome, 1977.
130 Emphasising the lack of this cultural ethos in Italian society are G. De 
Vergottini and G. Spangher, in Corruzione contro Costituzione, Padua, 2012, 
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However, the laws must be applied, in particular and 
firstly by a prepared and competent public administration, 
supported in being those things by investment in its 
formation, generational turnover and the acquisition of 
information technology. In relation to these requirements, 
the so-called invariance clause applied as standard, not only 
doesn’t help, but is dystonic.
There is no doubt that the law, and with it procedures, 
represent a victory and a bastion for those who do not hold 
power (public, since they do not share positions in the 
government of the public sector, or private sector, since 
they are not financially strong). Bureaucracy, in the modern 
sense of the word, was created to achieve collective aims 
according to criteria of impartiality, impersonal use of power 
and rationality: it is an instrument for sharing authority as 
opposed to the arbitrary exercise of the same131. In principle, 
therefore, the condition of corruption within a society cannot 
be removed by the existence of laws and procedures: good 
rules lower the risk of corruption as a way of affirming the 
principle of the supremacy of law over discretion132.
It is said (also referring to important historical 
references133) that the problem is caused by too many rules: 
respectively pp. 2 and 44.
131 Obligatory reading is the modern bureaucracy theorist M. Weber, Economy 
and Society, in the edition edited by W.J. Mommsen, M. Meyer, Rome 
(Donzelli), 2005; but see also for a more contemporary discussion K.J. Meier, 
L.J. O’Toole, Bureaucracy in a Democratic State: A Governance Perspective, 
Baltimore (The Johns Hopkins University Press), 2006. 
132 On the principle of legality and the characteristics of the norm (so it can be 
categorised as “law”), see the detailed case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights in relation to the interpretation and application of Art. 7 of 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, as explained 
by D. Rinoldi, L’ordine pubblico europeo, Naples, 2008, para. 41.
133 Notable is the comment made by Tacitus invoked by those who claim the 
inherent corruptive force of having many laws («Corruptissima re publica 
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of course, over-abundant laws often lead to difficulties 
with interpretation and application, aporias, contradictions; 
sobriety is a feature of good legislation. However, sobriety 
does not respond to objective, universal indicators, each 
situation deserving a greater or lesser degree of legislation. 
It is better, therefore, to turn our attention away from 
the quantity of rules and focus on their quality134. Now, 
when a situation of diffuse and pervasive illegality needs 
to be fought, the quality of the rule is measured in terms of 
its effectiveness and, therefore, on its ability to combat the 
situation. For this purpose, I believe some conditions must be 
taken into account in exercising normative activity of great 
importance: firstly, the incentive scope for those who are 
tasked with applying the rules of conduct and the procedures 
that result from the norm; then, the exercise of public power 
by a competent and ethical administration; and lastly, the 
presence of the same qualities in the public administration’s 
interlocutor. Lastly, there is the question concerning the 
interpretation and application of the norm: conceptual 
operations that must be informed by a substantialist criterion. 
The law, in fact, is an instrument that is not an end in itself, 
but is needed to achieve justice.
These are the conditions that cannot be improvised. 
Placing oneself in this context, perhaps we can better 
understand why it can be argued that (sober) laws and (good) 
procedures can contribute towards establishing a culture of 
individual responsibility, the anti-chamber of an undamaged 
social and legal context, where a few, linear rules are upheld 
plurimae leges»: Annales, Libro III, 27): the intended meaning of the author 
here is not that many laws produce corruption, but that a corrupt State 
multiplies the adoption of laws producing corruption, since adopted ad 
personam.
134 For a detailed legal discussion on this topic, see B.G. Mattarella, La trappola 
delle leggi. Molte, oscure, complicate, Bologna, 2011.
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by the best antidote to corruption, that is, transparency. But 
this condition (transparency in the public sector and in the 
management of private affairs) represents a victory that is 
obtained at the end of a long journey supported and guided 
by norms that indicate clear models of conduct and which 
contain incentives for virtuosity135, in order to accelerate the 
process of incorporating models of integrity into daily tasks, 
as much in the private sector as in the professional sector. 
Fighting corruption is a process; it cannot be eliminated 
instantaneously; in fact it takes a long time. It is certainly not 
a linear process and many of the instruments it uses could 
themselves be corrupted136. We need, therefore, to start to 
launch a cultural process to change the approach, the cultural 
approach of individuals starting with simple, clear norms 
of conduct.
Central in this context, is the question of equipping a 
legal system with a set of rules and procedures, which, of 
course, force each entity to accept an initial burden of work 
dictated by, for example, the risk based strategy. However, 
these are the rules and procedures, which if followed in a 
substantialist manner and not as merely formal compliance, 
in the long term lead to the construction of virtuous models of 
conduct. Furthermore, the acknowledgement of the severity 
of the damage produced by conduct that is now so pervasive 
should lead each public and private institution to respond 
135 On the need to equip anti-corruption legislation with incentives, see: S. 
Rose-Ackerman, Corruption: an Incentive-Based Approach, in various authors, 
Corruzione contro Costituzione. Percorsi costituzionali, no. 1/2, 2012, p. 109 et 
seq..; F.M. Teichmann, Eliminating Bribery. An Incentive-Based Approach, in 
Compliance Elliance Journal, 2018, p. 72 ss.; S. Rose-Ackerman, B.J. Palifka, 
Corruption and Government. Causes, Consequences, and Reform, New York 
(Cambridge Un. Press), 20162.
136 In the context of norms, which themselves produce corruption, see F. 
Giavazzi, G. Barbieri, Corruzione a norma di legge. La lobby delle grandi opere 
che affonda l’Italia, Milan (Rizzoli), 2014.
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to corruption offences using alternative models, capable 
of reversing the direction, and which are effective and not 
governed randomly. 
The lessons learned from the international context of 
action to combat a phenomenon that already stands out for its 
notable transnationality are very useful. They are offered as a 
support to each of the participating States (mediated because 
they are filtered by the extensive experience subsumed 
by national contexts at the level of inter-governmental 
cooperation) in order to reform national institutions and their 
procedures, recommending a reduction of State intervention 
in the market, the promotion of competitiveness including 
by merit (thus cutting back “privileged positions”), the 
reduction of barriers to entry for private companies, and 
an intact bureaucratic structure accompanied by better 
(because they are effective) control systems137.  International 
law evaluates State compliance not on the basis of a formal 
adjustment to the obligations it establishes, but rather on the 
basis of the effectiveness and efficiency of the latter.
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